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1. Introduction 
The minimum wage is a costly redistributive tool when it causes unemployment among the 
least productive workers. Despite the clear-cut predictions from the standard labour market 
theory that minimum wages above market-clearing wage level cause unemployment, many 
cross country studies differ widely on the labour market effects of minimum wages.
1 We 
argue that complementary regulatory measures in the labour market may influence the 
magnitude of minimum wage effects. Already existing distortions such as job protection can 
counteract the distortive effects of minimum wages. Job protection makes it more difficult for 
firms to exploit what they have learnt about workers’ productivities and thus creates 
asymmetric information. When employers can only imperfectly distinguish ex ante between 
high- and low- ability workers, they are not able to pay different wages. This implies that they 
do not compare the marginal productivity of a low-ability worker with the minimum wage but 
the higher expected marginal productivity. This change in the firms’ hiring pattern renders the 
minimum wage less harmful when complementary labour market policies are at work.  
To develop the argument we set up a simple model with two types of labour that differ with 
respect to their abilities (or productivities). In the scenario with symmetric information, firms 
can observe individual abilities and pay wages accordingly. In the scenario with asymmetric 
information, firms cannot distinguish ability types and, therefore, have to pay a uniform wage. 
This set-up is similar to the framework chosen by Blumkin and Sadka (2005). Different to 
Blumkin and Sadka (2005) optimal taxation approach, however, we abstract from the 
possibility of workers to provide some costly signal about their respective productivities and 
focus on a positive analysis, asking whether existing complementary regulatory measures that 
change the informational framework in the labour market might render a minimum wage less 
harmful. Thereby, we show how the impact of a statutory minimum wage hinges on 
productivity differences and on the initial distribution of the workers’ abilities. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and describe the 
equilibrium with symmetric information. Section 3 introduces the asymmetric information 
                                                 
1 See Neumark and Wascher (2008) for a comprehensive survey on the labour market impact of minimum 
wages.    2  
scenario. We compare the outcomes in the two scenarios with respect to employment in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. A standard labour market model with symmetric information 
There are two types of workers, low- and high-ability workers who are endowed with  l q  and 
h q  efficiency units of labour ( h l q q  ). The total number of workers is normalized to unity. 
The share of high-ability workers in the population is given by h.  l L  and  h L  denote actual 
employment of low- and high-ability workers, respectively.  
Without loss of generality, we normalize the total number of firms to unity. High- and low-
ability workers are substitutes in the production process where each firm produces according 
to  ) ( l l h h L q L q f   with  0   f  and  0    f . Different productivities are not due to differences 
in (observable) education but rather due to ex ante unobservable ability differences. All firms 
behave competitively and take the output price  1  p  and the wage rates  l w  and  h w  for the 
low- and high-ability workers as given. Profit maximization yields the first-order conditions 
0 ) (     

 
j j l l h h
j
w q L q L q f
L
     for  l h j ,  , 
which define the labour demand for high- and low-ability workers. In equilibrium, all workers 
have to be paid at least the legal minimum wage b ( b wj  , l h j ,  ). Depending on the 
magnitude of the minimum wage, we can distinguish four cases. 
Case A: If the minimum wage is below    l l h
full
s q h q h q f b ) 1 (       , all workers will be 
employed and we have  h Lh   and  h Ll  1 . This critical level above which a statutory 
minimum wage becomes binding depends on the productivities of both low- and high-ability 
workers and their respective shares. A larger share of high-ability workers reduces the 
marginal productivity of the last worker and thus the maximum non-binding minimum wage. 
Figure 1 depicts the outcome in the labour market with the share of the high-ability workers h 
on the horizontal axis and the minimum wage b on the vertical axis. All points below the 
declining 
full
s b -curve are characterized by full employment (area A), all points above are 
associated with unemployment. The 
full
s b -curve is downward sloping, i.e. the critical 
minimum wage will be lower the larger the fraction h of high-ability workers. An increase in 
h reduces marginal productivity as more efficiency units of labour are employed. This leads to    3  
lower employment levels for a given wage. As the wage for the low productivity workers 
cannot be adjusted downwards, they are the first to be laid off. 
Case B: If the minimum wage is slightly above the 
full
s b -curve, unemployment occurs but 
affects only low-ability workers up to the point where the last low-ability worker is laid off. In 
the interval  
] 1 [ h
s l h
full
s b q h q f b b
      , high-ability workers are fully employed, but there is 
unemployment among low-ability workers: 
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Figure 1: Employment with symmetric information 
 
Case C: Above the 
] 1 [ h
s b
 -curve, the minimum wage becomes so high that no low-ability 
worker will be employed. As long as the marginal productivity of the last high-ability worker 
is above the minimum wage, the firm will not lay off this type of worker. Thus, within the 
range  
] 1 [ ] 1 [ h
s h h
h
s b q h q f b b
       , it pays to employ all high-ability workers but it is not 
profitable to hire any low-ability worker: 
  h Lh   and  0  l L . (2) 
Case D: For 
] 1 [ h
s b b
  , even the high-ability workers face unemployment. The employment 
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3. Asymmetric information 
Now we turn to the case of asymmetric information. Firms can only detect an individual’s 
ability after having hired a new worker. Employment protection laws prevent firms from 
firing workers once they have learned about the productivities or from rewriting wage 
contracts. All firms decide simultaneously on the size of their workforce. From the point of 
view of an individual firm, the distribution of productivities follows a binomial distribution.  
As we are interested in the impact of pooling heterogeneous workers and not so much in the 
stochastic process itself, we facilitate the analysis by assuming that each firm is sufficiently 
large and gets a share of high-ability workers for sure. The average productivity amounts to 
) 1 ( h q h q q l h a     and the representative firm maximizes  wL L q f a    ) (  with respect to 
employment. The first-order condition immediately yields the labour demand 

1 1     a a q q w f L . We define the minimum wage that just ensures full employment ( 1  L ) 
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4. Comparing employment levels 
Do minimum wages generate the same unemployment patterns in the two informational 
scenarios? Comparing  a b  and 
full
s b  yields 
full
s l a a b q q b    with  1  l a q q . Thus we have 
Proposition 1. The level at which the minimum wage becomes harmful with 
asymmetric information always exceeds the respective level with symmetric 
information by the factor  1  l a q q.  
It follows from Proposition 1 that, if the minimum wage does not cause unemployment with 
symmetric information, it will never cause unemployment with asymmetric information. If the 
minimum wage is so low that it does not even prevent the employment of the last low-ability 
worker, it also cannot distort the allocation of labour with asymmetric information. Moreover, 
if the minimum wage is between the marginal productivity of the last low-ability worker and 
the expected marginal productivity at full employment, firms have no incentive to hire low-   5  
ability workers in the symmetric information scenario but would still hire a worker when the 
individual ability is unknown.  
A standard argument why the minimum wage may not be as harmful refers to monopsonistic 
structures in the labour market [Manning (2003)]. Proposition 1 provides an additional 
argument: asymmetric information has a softening effect on the detrimental impact of 
minimum wages in otherwise functioning labour markets because firms focus on expected 
marginal productivity rather than the lower marginal productivity of the low-ability type. 
In Figure 2 we add the  a b -curve to the lines introduced in Figure 1. We can distinguish six 
different outcomes. Proposition 1 describes the outcomes in the areas A, B1 and C1. In area A 
we have non-binding minimum wages in both scenarios. In areas B1 and C1, the minimum 
wage will destroy some (B1) or all jobs (C1) for low-ability workers with symmetric 
information while still ensuring full employment with asymmetric information. 
Figure 2: Employment levels – symmetric vs. asymmetric information 
 
In Figure 2, we assume that  a b  is upward sloping, which is the case for 
0 )) ( ) ( )( (          a a a l h a q f q q f q q h b .
2 An increase in h raises expected marginal 
productivity. This effect is not outweighed by the increase in efficiency units of labour so that 
the firms will hire more workers if h increases. This is in contrast to the symmetric 
information scenario where an increase in h always lowers marginal productivity of the low-
ability workers.  
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Proposition 2. With asymmetric information, raising the share of high-ability 
workers h allows the government to raise the minimum wage without harming 
employment if  0 ) ( ) (      a a a q f q q f.  
Unemployment occurs in both scenarios above the  a b -curve but employment will be higher in 
the asymmetric information scenario along the  a b -curve (and slightly above). Thus, the 
a s L L  -curve, on which employment levels (with  1  L ) are the same, must be in the areas 
B2, C2 and D in Figure 2. To determine the location of the  a s L L  -curve, consider the 
following thought experiment. If the firms hire exactly h workers in the asymmetric 
information scenario, marginal productivity will be  a a q hq f ) (  . In the symmetric case, the 
marginal productivities amount to    l h q h q f    and    h h q h q f    on the 
] 1 [ h
s b
 -curve and the 
] 1 [ h
s b
 -curve, respectively. Along the two curves and in-between, employment also amounts to 
h. As employment falls monotonically with b in the symmetric information scenario, the 
a s L L  -curve must be in area C2, if      h h a a l h q h q f q hq f q h q f        ) ( . This is the case for 
 0 ) (      x f x x f . In the alternative case (   0 ) (      x f x x f ), we get 
 l l a a q h q f q hq f     ) ( , which implies that on the 
] 1 [ h
s b
 -curve employment is still higher with 
asymmetric information. Thus, for   0 ) (      x f x x f , the  a s L L  -curve must be located in 
area D. 
Below the  a s L L  -curve, employment is always larger in the asymmetric information 
scenario.
3 For moderate minimum wages, which only affect the low-ability workers, 
asymmetric information renders a statutory minimum wage less harmful. Only with very high 
minimum wages, the economy may achieve higher employment levels when firms operate 
under symmetric information. Thus, the negative employment effects of a minimum wage can 
be alleviated in the presence of complementary regulatory measures such as job protection 
that de facto introduces asymmetric information about workers’ abilities. Above the  a s L L  -
curve, the minimum wage is more harmful in the asymmetric information setting. This can be 
summarized in  
                                                 
3 Along the  a s L L  -curve, output is higher in the symmetric information scenario because only high-ability 
workers are employed. It is straightforward to show that the iso-output curve is also in area C2 and below the 
a s L L  -curve.    7  
Proposition 3. If the minimum wage affects high-ability workers in the symmetric 
information scenario, asymmetric information renders the impact of a statutory 
minimum wage always more harmful for    0 ) (      x f x x f . 
5. Conclusion 
The standard economic analysis shows that a minimum wage above the full employment 
wage for low-ability workers causes unemployment. Our analysis has shown that this may not 
be true in the presence of complementary regulatory measures such as job protection that 
affect the informational structure in the labour market. Generating asymmetric information 
forces firms to focus on average rather than marginal productivities when hiring workers. A 
statutory minimum wage below the average productivity at full employment allows the 
government to raise the wage of low-ability workers without distorting the labour market. 
High minimum wages, however, also cause unemployment with asymmetric information. 
Eventually, the existence of complementary policy measures becomes detrimental. 
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